Maintenance statistics

So the preliminary investigation of QZ8501 crash was disclosed a few days ago, 12 months after the fateful Airasia flight from Surabaya to Singapore went down into the Java Sea.

The cause of the accident was highlighted as a congruence of technical fault and lack of pilot training.

(A) Technical fault

The Rudder Throttle Limiter (RTL) is a component which operates the rudder of the plane. Records retrieved from the black box revealed that it failed 4 times during the fateful flight. The pilots managed to resolve the issue during the first 3 occurrences. However, on the 4^th, one of them breached protocol and manually reset the RTL by disconnecting the relay. The electrical circuits broke and resulted in the plane carrying out a 6 deg/sec left roll (whereas a ‘safe’ roll is 2-3 deg/sec). Both pilots quickly tried to level the plane but did not immediately notice that it was ascending. Awhile later, one pilot alerted to the other to bring the plane down; however the instruction was overlooked. Unable to ascend any further, the plane then stalled and plunged into the ocean, killing all 167.

The investigation also uncovered gross under-maintenance issues. Horrifying was that the RTL had been reported faulty a staggering 23 times over the last 12 months! Details such as the break down of the exact faults and rectifications are not disclosed yet, but this shocking discovery raises many eyebrows of Airasia’s maintenance regime and standards.

(B) Inadequate pilot training

One of the pilots was a former Airforce pilot. Apparently, Airasia admitted that both pilots did not undergo emergency procedural training (can’t recall the term for it) as they felt there is no likelihood of the occurrence of such emergencies. Not sure what other flight operators opine of this. Unfortunately, the decision made by the pilot to troubleshoot the RTL by taking matters into this own hands (pun intended) was a severe lapse of the individual.

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This investigation does nothing to alleviate the pain, sorrow and heartaches of the immediate families affected but I hope it at least provides them with a reason... or a closure to their endless whys.

In addition, I hope this incident serves a wake-up call to all MRO companies to critically review their maintenance regime and not be complacent.

23 times in 12 months? By any standards that is too striking a statistic, let alone from a critical component and for a flight operator! IMO, this incident merely uncovered the tip of an iceberg of the incalculable, dormant ‘timebombs’ of all MRO operations. I am a serious advocate for an independent, third-party analysis for all MRO operations. The analysis must be conducted CHC – comprehensively and holistically and continuously. Before any analysis can be done, there must be a reliable system which allows maintenance records to be logged, documented and tabled. And of course, there’s no way that maintenance activities can be logged down by themselves… an awful amount of investment has to be put into technical skillsets training.

Half-joked to wifey that perhaps, just perhaps, I could consider the path of a MRO consultant...